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ABSTRACT
We revisit the opinion susceptibility problem that was proposed by
Abebe et al. [1], in which agents influence one another’s opinions
through an iterative process. Each agent has some fixed innate opin-
ion. In each step, the opinion of an agent is updated to some convex
combination between its innate opinion and the weighted average
of its neighbors’ opinions in the previous step. The resistance of an
agent measures the importance it places on its innate opinion in
the above convex combination. Under non-trivial conditions, this
iterative process converges to some equilibrium opinion vector. For
the unbudgeted variant of the problem, the goal is to select the
resistance of each agent (from some given range) such that the sum
of the equilibrium opinions is minimized.
Contrary to the claim in the aforementioned KDD 2018 paper,
the objective function is in general non-convex. Hence, formulating
the problem as a convex program might have potential correctness
issues. We instead analyze the structure of the objective function,
and show that any local optimum is also a global optimum, which is
somehow surprising as the objective function might not be convex.
Furthermore, we combine the iterative process and the local search
paradigm to design very efficient algorithms that can solve the
unbudgeted variant of the problem optimally on large-scale graphs
containing millions of nodes.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Human-centered computing → Social network analysis; •
Mathematics of computing→ Graph algorithms;
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1 INTRODUCTION
We revisit the opinion susceptibility problem that was proposed
by Abebe et al. [1], in which agents in a network influence one
another’s opinions through an iterative process. In this model, the
opinion of an agent at each step is a function of its innate opinion
and its neighbors’ opinions in the previous step. The susceptibility
of an agent i to persuasion is measured by a resistance parame-
ter αi ∈ (0, 1), where a larger value of αi means that agent i places
more importance on its innate opinion. Under very mild conditions
(such as every αi > 0), the iterative process converges to a unique
equilibrium opinion vector.
As remarked in [1], opinion interference in social networks have
wide applications in product marketing and political campaigns.
While most previous works [6, 11, 16] investigatedmodels on chang-
ing the opinions directly, [1] is the first work that considered mod-
ifying the susceptibility of individual agents. Using a number in
[0, 1] to represent an agent’s opinion, they considered the prob-
lem of modifying the agents’ resistances such that the sum of the
equilibrium opinions is minimized (or equivalently maximized by
applying the transformation x 7→ 1 − x on each opinion).
Abebe et al. [1] pointed out several works in social psychology
that have investigated people’s susceptibility to persuasion, includ-
ing studies on how peer pressure can make adolescents exhibit
risky and antisocial behavior [2, 5, 7], and on the role of suscepti-
bility in politics [19]. Factors such as self-esteem, locus of control,
awareness of specific issues, as well as exposure to people in the
same network can contribute to an individual’s susceptibility to
persuasion. As a result, by affecting these factors or introducing
persuasive cues [15], one can make an individual more or less sus-
ceptible to persuasion, i.e., the resistance parameter can be lowered
or increased.
Observe that the problem is trivial if the resistance of each agent
can be picked from the closed interval [0, 1]. For minimizing the
equilibrium opinions, it suffices to make the agent with the min-
imum innate opinion the most resistant (setting its resistance to
1) and everyone else totally compliant (setting its resistance to 0).
The problem is non-trivial if the resistance αi of each agent i can
take value from some interval [li ,ui ], where 0 < li < ui < 1. Under
this restriction, Abebe et al. [1] showed that it suffices to consider
extreme points in the resistance vector space, i.e., for each agent i ,
one can pick αi ∈ {li ,ui }. Moreover, they attempt to model the
problem using a convex program. However, contrary to their claim,
we have discovered that the objective function is in general neither
convex nor concave (see Figure 1 in Section 2). Hence, there could
be potential correctness issues with their approach. Furthermore,
a general convex program is quite expensive to solve, and indeed,
the experiments in [1] were performed on networks with less than
1000 nodes, most likely because their approach is non-scalable to
large networks.
This work resolves both the correctness and scalability issues
in [1]. We give a thorough analysis of the problem structure to de-
sign a provably correct local search framework, and further exploit
the properties of the iterative process to implement our algorithms
that are efficient enough to run on networks with millions of nodes.
Our Contributions.We study the structure of the opinion suscep-
tibility problem [1] in detail, and also make algorithmic contribu-
tions, which we describe as follows.
• Analysis of problem structure. Contrary to the claim in [1],
we discover that the objective function is in general neither
convex nor concave. However, we have also recovered (in
Corollary 3.4) that for each agent, it is sufficient to set its
resistance to either the lower or the upper bound, i.e., we
can search for an optimal resistance vector from the set of
extreme points of its feasible region.
We analyze the mathematical structure of the problem in
Section 3. Perhaps the most important technical insight in
this paper is that we show (in Lemma 3.9) that if the current
vector solution is not optimal, then there exists a coordinate
that can be flipped such that the objective will be strictly
improved. This shows that an optimal vector can be found
by a simple local search algorithm.
• Local search with irrevocable updates. In general, local search
could still take exponential time to find an optimal solution,
for instance, the simplex algorithm for linear programming.
For minimizing the sum of equilibrium opinions, we show
(in Lemma 4.1) that starting from the upper bound resistance
vector, then the local search algorithm will flip each coordi-
nate at most once, which implies that an optimal vector can
be found in polynomial time.
• Efficient Local Search on Large-Scale Graphs. Typically, in lo-
cal search, the objective function needs to be evaluated at the
current solution in each step. However, since the objective
function involves matrix inverse, its evaluation will be too
expensive when the dimension of the matrix is in the order
of millions. Instead, we use the iterative process of the opin-
ion dynamics model itself to approximate the equilibrium
vector. We have developed several update strategies for local
search. For conservative or opportunistic updates, one always
makes sure that the error of the estimated equilibrium vec-
tor is small enough before any coordinate of the resistance
vector is flipped. For optimistic update, one might flip a co-
ordinate of the resistance vector even before the estimated
equilibrium vector is accurate enough. However, this might
introduce mistakes which need to be corrected later. Nev-
ertheless, experiments show that mistakes are rarely made
by the optimistic update strategy. In any case, for all three
update strategies, an optimal vector will be returned when
the local search terminates.
Our approaches are scalable and can run on networks with
millions of nodes. We report the experimental results in
Section 5. In particular, using multiple number of threads, the
optimistic update strategy can solve the problem optimally
on networks with up to around 65 million nodes.
1.1 Related Works
The most related work is the KDD 2018 paper [1] by Abebe et al.,
who gave a history of the problem and other related works, to
which the reader can refer. Here we just give a brief summary.
History of Model. As mentioned in [1], the opinion dynamics model
is inspired by theworks of DeGroot [4] and Friedkin and Johnsen [8].
DeGroot considered the special case where all resistance αi ’s equal
0, and the opinion vector update rule reduces to z(t ) := Pz(t−1) ∈
RV , for some row stochastic matrix P . This model is well understood
through the theory of Markov chains, which typically uses the
transpose of P in the update rule: z(t ) := PTz(t−1) ∈ RV . The
iterative process considered in this paper is exactly the model in [8],
which also investigated the conditions under which the process
converges to a unique equilibrium vector.
Budgeted Variant. We have so far discussed only the unbudgeted
variant of the opinion optimization problem, where the resistance
of every agent can be modified. The budgeted variant of the problem
has also been considered in [1], where some initial resistance vector
α ∈ (0, 1)V and some budget k ∈ Z are given, and the algorithm
is allowed to change at most k coordinates of α . It is shown that
the budgeted variant is NP-hard [1]. An obvious approach is to
use some greedy paradigm to pick k coordinates to modify one
by one, where the next coordinate is picked to have the largest
improvement in the objective function. However, no theoretical
guarantee was given for budgeted variant in [1]. Since our analysis
of the unbudgeted variant is already quite involved, this paper will
focus on the unbudgeted case. We will leave the analysis of the
greedy algorithm for the budgeted variant as future work, which
we briefly discuss in the conclusion section.
Non-Convex Optimization. In general, optimizing a non-convex
function under non-convex constraints is NP-hard. However, in
many cases, one can exploit the structure of the objective function
or constraints to devise polynomial-time algorithms; see the sur-
vey by Jain and Kar [13] on non-convex optimization algorithms
encountered in machine learning. Indeed, variants of the gradient
descent have been investigated to escape saddle points by Jin et
al. [14], who also gave examples of problems where all local optima
are also global optima; some examples are tensor decomposition [9],
dictionary learning [22], phase retrieval [21], matrix sensing [3, 20]
and matrix completion [10]. However, all these problems involve
some quadratic loss functions, whose structures are totally different
from our objective functions which involve matrix inverse.
Hartman [12] considered the special case that the objective func-
tion is the difference of two convex functions. Strekalovsky devised
a local search method to optimize such objective functions. Even
though the objective functions in our problem are somewhere con-
vex and somewhere concave (see Figure 1), it is not immediately
clear if they can be expressed as differences of convex functions.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We revisit the opinion susceptibility problem that was proposed by
Abebe et al. [1], which we rephrase using more general parameters.
In an opinion dynamics model, there is a set V of agents, whose
innate opinions are given by a vector s ∈ [0, 1]V . The interaction be-
tween agents are captured by a row stochastic matrix P ∈ [0, 1]V×V ,
i.e., each entry of P is non-negative and every row sums to 1. In
the rest of this paper, we always call P the interaction matrix. The
susceptibility of the agents is measured by the resistance vector
α ∈ (0, 1)V , where a higher αi value means that agent i is more
resistant.
As mentioned in [1], the opinion vector of agents evolves in
discrete time according to the equation z(t+1) := As + (I −A)Pz(t ),
where A = Diag(α) is the diagonal matrix with Aii = αi and I
is the identity matrix. Equating z(t ) with z(t+1), one can see that
the equilibrium opinion vector is given by z = [I − (I −A)P]−1As ,
which exists under non-trivial conditions such as every αi > 0. The
objective is to choose a resistance vector α to minimize the sum
of equilibrium opinions ⟨1, z⟩ = 1T z. Observe that one can also
consider maximizing the sum of equilibrium opinions; however,
since the techniques are essentially the same, we will focus on the
minimization variant of the problem.
Definition 2.1 (Opinion Susceptibility Problem). Given a set V
of agents with innate opinions s ∈ [0, 1]V and interaction matrix
P ∈ [0, 1]V×V , suppose for each i ∈ V , its resistance is restricted to
some interval Ii := [li ,ui ] ⊆ [0, 1] where we assume that 0 < li <
ui < 1.
The objective is to choose α ∈ IV := ×i ∈V Ii ⊆ [0, 1]V such that
the following objective function is minimized:
f (α) := 1T [I − (I −A)P]−1As,
where A = Diag(α) is the diagonal matrix with Aii = αi . Observe
that the assumption α > 0 ensures that the above inverse exists.
Unbudgeted vs Budgeted Variants. In Definition 2.1, we are allowed
to modify the resistance of any agent, and this is known as the
unbudgeted variant. However, in [1], the budgeted variant is also
considered: given some initial resistance vector and a budget k , the
resistance of at most k agents can be changed. In this paper, we
focus on efficient algorithms that optimally solve the unbudgeted
variant.
Technical Assumption. To simplify our proofs, we assume that
the interaction matrix P corresponds to an irreducible random walk.
Irreducibility is satisfied if P arises from a connected graph.
Non-convex Objective. Contrary to the claim in [1], the objective
f in Definition 2.1 is in general not a convex function of α . In fact,
the following example shows that it might be neither convex nor
concave. Consider three vertices V = {1, 2, 3}, where the innate
vector s and the interaction matrix P are given by: s =

1
0.5
0
 and
P =

0 0.5 0.5
0.5 0 0.5
0.5 0.5 0
 .
Suppose we fix α2 = α3 = 0.1 and consider the objective as
a function of α1 as д(α1) = 1T [I − (I − A)P]−1As , where A =
Diag(α1,α2,α3). Then, the plot of д in Figure 1 (a) shows that it is
not convex. Moreover, suppose this time we fix α1 = α2 = 0.1 and
consider the objective as a function of α3 as h(α3) = 1T [I − (I −
A)P]−1As . Then, the plot of h in Figure 1 (b) shows that it is not
concave.
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Figure 1: Cross-Sections of Objective Function
3 STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES OF OBJECTIVE
FUNCTION
In this section, we investigate the properties of the objective func-
tion f in Definition 2.1; we assume that the interaction matrix P
and the innate opinion vector s are fixed, and f is a function on
the resistance vector α . Contrary to the claim in [1], the objective
function is in general not convex. Fortunately, we can still exploit
some properties of the function. As we shall see, even when the
function is not convex, every local optimum (which will be defined
formally) is a global optimum. This enables us to use variants of
the local search method to solve the problem optimally.
3.1 Marginal Monotonicity
As in [1], we show that when one chooses the resistance αi for
each agent i ∈ V , it suffices to consider the extreme points {li ,ui }.
Our approach explicitly analyzes the partial derivative ∂f (α )∂αi which
plays amajor role in the local search algorithm that we later develop.
Intuition: Guidance by Current Equilibrium Vector. Observe
that given the innate opinion vector s and irreducible interaction
matrix P , for some resistance vector α ∈ (0, 1)V , the equilibrium
opinion vector is given by z(α) = [I − (I − A)P]−1As , where A =
Diag(α). For some i ∈ V , if the innate opinion si is larger than
its equilibrium zi (α), this suggests that by being more stubborn,
agent i should be able to increase its equilibrium opinion. In other
words, one would expect ∂zi (α )∂αi and si − zi (α) to have the same
sign. However, what is surprising is that in Lemma 3.2, we shall see
that even for any j ∈ V , ∂zj (α )∂αi and si − zi (α) have the same sign.
Notation. For any α ∈ RV and K ⊆ V , let α−K ∈ RV denote the
vector such that α−K (i) = α(i) if i < K , and α−K (i) = 0 if i ∈ K , i.e.,
the coordinates K of α are replaced with 0. Similarly, given α ∈ RV ,
we denote A−K = Diag(α−K ).
In Definition 2.1, observe that the inverse [I − (I − A)P]−1 is
involved in the objective function f (α), where A = Diag(α). Since
we wish to analyze the effect on f (α) of changing only a subset
of coordinates in α , the next lemma will be used for simplifying
matrix arithmetic involving the computation of inverses. Its proof
is deferred to Section 6.
Lemma 3.1 (Inverse Arithmetic). GivenK ( V and α ∈ (0, 1)V ,
letA := Diag(α) and recall that P is the irreducible interaction matrix.
Then, the inverse M = [I − (I − A−K )P]−1 exists, and every entry
of M is positive. Moreover, for each k ∈ V , define ak = 0 if k ∈ K ,
otherwise ak = αk . Then, we have:
(1) (PM)kk = Mkk−11−ak > 0;
(2) (PM)k j = Mk j1−ak > 0, for each j , k .
Lemma 3.2 (Sign of Partial Derivative). In the Opinion Suscep-
tibility Problem in Definition 2.1, given the innate opinion vector s and
irreducible interaction matrix P , recall that z(α) := [I −(I −A)P]−1As ,
where A = Diag(α). Then, for any α ∈ (0, 1)V and any i,k ∈ V ,
the two values ∂zk (α )∂αi and si − zi (α) have exactly the same sign in{−, 0,+}.
In particular, this implies that ∂f (α )∂αi =
∑
k ∈V
∂zk (α )
∂αi
also has the
same sign as si − zi (α).
Proof. By the definition of the inverse of a matrix B, we have
BB−1 = I . The partial derivative with respect to a variable t is:
∂B
∂t B
−1 + B ∂B−1∂t = 0. Hence, we have
∂B−1
∂t = −B−1 ∂B∂t B−1. Apply-
ing the above result with B = I − (I −A)P and t = αi and denoting
M = [I − (I − A)P]−1, we get ∂M∂αi = −MeieTi PM . Considering
z(α) = MAs , we have ∂z(α )∂αi =
∂M
∂αi
As + MeieTi s . Replacing
∂M
∂αi
,
we obtain for any i,k ∈ V :
∂zk (α)
∂αi
= −eTkMeieTi PMAs + eTkMeieTi s = Mki · [si − eTi Pz(α)].
By Lemma 3.1 with K = ∅, we know that every entry of M is
positive. Thus, the sign of ∂zk (α )∂αi is the same as that of the scalar
si − eTi Pz(α).
RecallingM = [I − (I −A)P]−1, we have [I − (I −A)P]M = I ⇒
(I −A)PM = M − I ⇒ PM = (I −A)−1(M − I )where (I −A)−1 exists
since α j < 1 for each j ∈ V .
Next, since z(α) = MAs , we have:
Pz(α) = PMAs = (I −A)−1(M − I )As = (I −A)−1[z(α) −As].
Finally, replacing Pz(α), we have
si − eTi Pz(α) =si − eTi (I −A)−1[z(α) −As]
=si − 11 − αi [zi (α) − αisi ]
=
1
1 − αi [si − zi (α)].
Since 1−αi > 0, it follows that ∂zk (α )∂αi and si −zi (α) have exactly
the same sign in {−, 0,+}, as required. 
The next lemma shows that the sign of the partial derivatives
with respect to coordinate i is actually independent of the current
value αi . Its proof is deferred to Section 6.
Lemma 3.3 (Sign of Partial Derivative Independent of Co-
ordinate Value). Referring to Lemma 3.2. For any α ∈ (0, 1)V and
any i ∈ V , denote M = [I − (I − A−{i })P]−1. Then, ∂f (α )∂αi has the
same sign in {−, 0,+} as si −∑j,i Mi jα jsj , which is independent of
αi .
Corollary 3.4 (Extreme Points are Sufficient). In Definition
2.1, for any i ∈ V , fixing the resistance values of all other agents except
i , the objective f (α) is a monotone function in αi . This implies that
to minimize f , it suffices to consider the extreme points αi ∈ {li ,ui },
for each i ∈ V .
3.2 Local vs Global Optimum
As shown in Corollary 3.4, it suffices to choose the resistance vector
α from the extreme points in Definition 2.1. Lemma 3.2 readily
gives a method to decide, given a current choice of α , whether the
objective f can be decreased by changing the resistance of some
agent. In Lemma 3.9, we show that if α is not a global minimum,
then such an agent must exist. As we shall see, this implies that a
local search method can find a global minimum.
Given α and α ′ ∈ RV , denote ∆(α ,α ′) := {i ∈ V : αi , α ′i } as
the set of coordinates at which the vectors differ.
Definition 3.5 (Local Minimizer). Given an objective function
f : IV → R, a vector α ∈ IV is a local minimizer of f , if for all
α ′ ∈ IV such that ∆(α ,α ′) = 1, f (α) ≤ f (α ′).
Notation. When we wish to consider the effect of changing the
resistance of only 2 agents i , k ∈ V , we write f (α) = f (αi ,αk ),
assuming that α−{i,k } is fixed.
Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7 give some technical results involving chang-
ing the resistance of two agents. Their proofs are deferred to Sec-
tion 6.
Lemma 3.6. For any i,k ∈ V such that i , k , let M = [I − (I −
A−{i })P]−1 and R = [I − (I −A−{i,k })P]−1. Then for any j ∈ V , we
have
(1) Mjk =
Rjk
1+αkRkk−αk ,
(2) Mjh = Rjh − αkRjkRkh1+αkRkk−αk , for h , k .
In particular, the quantity in Lemma 3.3 can be rewritten as follows:
si−
∑
j,i
Mi jα jsj = si−
∑
j,i,k
Ri jα jsj− αkRik1 + αkRkk − αk
(sk−
∑
j,i,k
Rk jα jsj ).
Lemma 3.7 (Diagonal Entry). Suppose α ∈ (0, 1)V , recall that
A−{i,k } := Diag(α−{i,k }), and P corresponds to an irreducible inter-
action matrix. For any i,k ∈ V such that i , k , let R = [I − (I −
A−{i,k })P]−1, then Rii = maxj ∈V Rji . Moreover, Rii = Rki if and
only if Pkk + Pki = 1.
The following lemma gives the key insight for why local search
works. Intuitively, it shows that there does not exist any discrete
“saddle point”. Even though its proof is technical, we still include it
here because of its importance.
Lemma 3.8 (Switching Lemma). Recall that f is defined in Defini-
tion 2.1 with an irreducible interaction matrix P , and assume |V | ≥ 3.
Suppose α , β ∈ (0, 1)V such that ∆(α , β) = {i,k} for some i , k .
Moreover, suppose further that
min{ f (αi ,αk ), f (βi , βk )} < min{ f (αi , βk ), f (βi ,αk )}.
Then, we have
max{ f (αi ,αk ), f (βi , βk )} > min{ f (αi , βk ), f (βi ,αk )}.
Proof. We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose
max{ f (αi ,αk ), f (βi , βk )} ≤ min{ f (αi , βk ), f (βi ,αk )}.
Without loss of generality, suppose further that f (αi ,αk ) ≥ f (βi , βk ).
Then, we have
f (αi ,αk ) ≤
{
f (βi ,αk )
f (αi , βk )
and f (βi , βk ) <
{
f (βi ,αk )
f (αi , βk ).
We remark that it is important to distinguish between the strict
and non-strict inequality. We use the notation f ′i to denote the
partial derivative with respect to coordinate i .
From f (αi ,αk ) ≤ f (βi ,αk ) and the fact that f is marginally
monotone (Lemma 3.3) and f ′i (x ,αk ) has the same sign in {−, 0,+}
for x ∈ (0, 1), we have
f ′i (_,αk ) · (αi − βi ) ≤ 0. (1)
On the other hand, from the strict inequality f (βi , βk ) < f (βi ,αk ),
we know the partial derivative f ′k (βi ,y) must have the same non-
zero sign in {−,+}, again from Lemma 3.3. Therefore, we have:
f ′k (βi , _) · (αk − βk ) > 0. (2)
Similarly, f (αi ,αk ) ≤ f (αi , βk ) and f (βi , βk ) < f (αi , βk ) give
the following:
f ′k (αi , _) · (αk − βk ) ≤ 0, (3)
f ′i (_, βk ) · (αi − βi ) > 0. (4)
Next, using Lemma 3.3 and R as defined in Lemma 3.6, the above
inequalities (1) to (4) become:
[si −
∑
j,i,k
Ri jα jsj − αkRik1 + αkRkk − αk
(sk −
∑
j,i,k
Rk jα jsj )](αi − βi ) ≤ 0,
[sk −
∑
j,i,k
Rk jβjsj −
βiRki
1 + βiRii − βi (si −
∑
j,i,k
Ri jβjsj )](αk − βk ) > 0,
[sk −
∑
j,i,k
Rk jα jsj −
αiRki
1 + αiRii − αi (si −
∑
j,i,k
Ri jα jsj )](αk − βk ) ≤ 0,
[si −
∑
j,i,k
Ri jβjsj − βkRik1 + βkRkk − βk
(sk −
∑
j,i,k
Rk jβjsj )](αi − βi ) > 0.
Recall that α j = βj for j , i,k . Hence, we denote:
ci := si −
∑
j,i,k
Ri jα jsj = si −
∑
j,i,k
Ri jβjsj ,
ck := sk −
∑
j,i,k
Rk jα jsj = sk −
∑
j,i,k
Rk jβjsj ,
дi (x) := xRki1 + xRii − x and дk (x) :=
xRik
1 + xRkk − x
.
Then, we have
[ci − дk (αk )ck ](αi − βi ) ≤0, (5)
[ck − дi (βi )ci ](αk − βk ) >0, (6)
[ck − дi (αi )ci ](αk − βk ) ≤0, (7)
[ci − дk (βk )ck ](αi − βi ) >0. (8)
Observe that ci , 0, otherwise (6) and (7) contradict each other.
Similarly, ck , 0, otherwise (5) and (8) contradict each other. We
next argue that cick > 0.
From (5) and (8) we have
[ci − дk (αk )ck ][ci − дk (βk )ck ] ≤ 0. (9)
If cick < 0, then the above expression will be positive, because
дk (·) ≥ 0 (we shall see that later). Hence, we conclude that ci and
ck have the same sign.
From (6) and (7) we have
[ck − дi (βi )ci ][ck − дi (αi )ci ] ≤ 0. (10)
Rearranging (9) and (10), we have:
[ ci
ck
− дk (αk )][
ci
ck
− дk (βk )] ≤ 0,
and
[ck
ci
− дi (βi )][ck
ci
− дi (αi )] ≤ 0.
Note that every entry of R is positive by Lemma 3.1 and we can
easily prove дi (·) and дk (·) are both strictly increasing functions in
[0, 1]. Since α , β ∈ (0, 1)V , the above two inequalities imply that
0 = дk (0) < дk (min{αk , βk }) ≤
ci
ck
,
ci
ck
≤ дk (max{αk , βk }) < дk (1) =
Rik
Rkk
≤ 1,
and
0 = дi (0) < дi (min{αi , βi }) ≤ ck
ci
,
ck
ci
≤ дi (max{αi , βi }) < дi (1) = Rki
Rii
≤ 1,
where RikRkk ≤ 1 and
Rki
Rii ≤ 1 are from Lemma 3.7.
Notice that we get 0 < cick < 1 and 0 <
ck
ci < 1, which is a
contradiction. Hence, the proof is completed. 
Lemma 3.9 (Descending Coordinate). Let f be the function as
defined in Definition 2.1. Suppose α , β ∈ (0, 1)V such that f (α) >
f (β). Then, there exists some i ∈ ∆(α , β) and γ ∈ (0, 1)V such that
∆(α ,γ ) = {i}, ∆(γ , β) = ∆(α , β) \ {i}, and f (α) > f (γ ).
In other words, by switching one coordinate (corresponding to i) of
α to that of β , the objective function f decreases strictly.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on |∆(α , β)|. The base
case |∆(α , β)| = 1 is trivial.
We consider the inductive step with |∆(α , β)| = q, for someq ≥ 2.
Given a list S of coordinates from ∆(α , β), we use α[S ] to denote
the resulting vector obtained from switching coordinates S of α to
those of β .
For contradiction’s sake, we assume that for all j ∈ ∆(α , β),
f (α[j]) ≥ f (α); moreover, we pick i ∈ ∆(α , β) such that f (α[i]) is
minimized.
Observe that f (α[i]) ≥ f (α) > f (β) and |∆(α[i], β)| = q −
1. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, there exists some k ∈
∆(α[i], β) such that f (α[i]) > f (α[i,k ]).
Next, starting from α , we shall fix all coordinates in V except
i and k , and we write the objective f (x ,y) as a function on only
these two coordinates.
Observe that we have already assumed that
f (αi ,αk ) ≤ min{ f (βi ,αk ), f (αi , βk )}. (11)
Moreover, from above, we have f (α[i]) > f (α[i,k]), which trans-
lates to f (βi ,αk ) > f (βi , βk ). Observe thatwemust have f (αi , βk ) ≤
f (βi , βk ); otherwise, we have f (βi , βk ) < min{ f (βi ,αk ), f (αi , βk )},
which, together with (11), will contradict Lemma 3.8.
Therefore, we have f (α[k ]) = f (αi , βk ) ≤ f (βi , βk ) < f (βi ,αk ) =
f (α[i]), which contradicts the choice of i ∈ ∆(α , β) to minimize
f (α[i]). This completes the inductive step and also the proof of the
lemma. 
Corollary 3.10. For the function f in Definition 2.1 every local
minimizer is a global minimizer.
Proof. Suppose that α is a local minimizer, but there is some β
with f (α) > f (β). Then, Lemma 3.9 implies there is some γ with
|∆(α ,γ )| = 1 such that f (α) > f (γ ), contradicting that α is a local
minimizer. 
4 EFFICIENT LOCAL SEARCH
In Section 3, we conclude in Corollary 3.4 that it suffices to consider
the extreme points of the search space of resistance vectors. More-
over, Corollary 3.10 states that every local minimizer is a global
minimizer. Since we know how to compute the sign of the partial
derivative with respect to each coordinate using Lemma 3.2, we can
design a simple local search algorithm to find a global minimizer.
However, it is possible thatO(2n ) extreme points are encountered
before a global minimizer is reached. Fortunately, in this section, we
will explore further properties of the objective function, and design
a local search algorithm that encounters at most O(n) extreme
points before finding a global minimizer.
4.1 Irrevocable Updates
Local Search Strategy.We shall start with the upper bound resis-
tance vector, i.e., for each i ∈ V , αi = ui . This induces the corre-
sponding equilibrium opinion vector z(α). According to Lemma 3.2,
if there is some agent i such that αi = ui and si −zi (α) > 0, then we
should flip αi to the lower bound li . The following lemma shows
that each αi will be flipped at most once. Essentially, we show that
we will never encounter the situation that there is some agent k
such that αk = lk and sk −zk (α) < 0, in which case we would have
to switch αk back to uk .
Lemma 4.1 (Each Coordinate Flipped atMost Once). Starting
from the upper bound resistance vector, the above local search strategy
flips each αi at most once.
Proof. We first show that for each agent k ∈ V , the quantity
sk −zk (α) cannot decrease when α is modified according to the local
search strategy. According to the strategy, α is modified because
there is some agent i such that αi = ui and si − zi (α) > 0. By
Lemma 3.2, ∂zk∂αi > 0 for each k ∈ V . Hence, after αi is switched
from ui to li , zk (α) decreases, and the quantity sk −zk (α) increases.
Observe that if a coordinate αk is ever flipped from uk to lk , this
means that at that moment, we must have sk − zk (α) > 0, which,
as we have just shown, will stay positive after α is subsequently
updated. 
4.2 Approximating the Equilibrium Vector
Observe that in our local search algorithm, we need to compute the
equilibrium opinion vector z(α) = [I−(I−A)P)]−1As for the current
resistance vector α , where A = Diag(α). However, computing ma-
trix inverse is an expensive operation. Instead, we approximate z(α)
using the recurrence z(0) ∈ [0, 1]V and z(t+1) := As + (I −A)Pz(t ).
The following lemma gives an upper bound on the additive error
for each coordinate.
Lemma 4.2 (Approximation Error). Suppose for some ϵ > 0, for
all i ∈ V , αi ≥ ϵ . Then, for every t ≥ 0, ∥z(α) − z(t )∥∞ ≤ (1−ϵ )
t
ϵ .
Proof. Using the Neumann series [I − (I −A)P)]−1 = ∑∞j=0[(I −
A)P]j , we have z(α) − z(t ) = ∑∞j=t [(I −A)P]jAs − [(I −A)P]tz(0).
We next prove, by induction, that for any x ∈ [0, 1]V , ∥[(I −
A)P]jx ∥∞ ≤ (1 − ϵ)j , for all j ≥ 0. The base case j = 0 is trivial
because every coordinate of x is between 0 and 1. For the inductive
step, assume that for some j ≥ 0, every coordinate of y = [(I −
A)P]jx has magnitude at most (1 − ϵ)i . Since P is a row stochastic
matrix, it follows that ∥Py∥∞ ≤ (1− ϵ)j ; finally, since αi ≥ ϵ for all
i ∈ V , we have ∥(I −A)Py∥∞ ≤ (1−ϵ)j+1, completing the induction
proof.
Finally, observing that both
∑∞
j=t [(I −A)P]jAs and [(I −A)P]tz(0)
have non-negative coordinates, we have
∥z(α) − z(t )∥∞ ≤ max{∥
∞∑
j=t
[(I −A)P]jAs∥, ∥[(I −A)P]tz(0)∥}
≤
∞∑
j=t
(1 − ϵ)j = (1 − ϵ)
t
ϵ
as required. 
4.3 Local Search Algorithm
Based on Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, we give a local search framework in
Algorithm 1. Observe that in line 1, we perturb the innate opinions s
slightly to ensure that for each resistance vector α encountered, no
coordinate of s and z(α) would coincide.
The while loop in line 4 combines local search to update α
and estimation of the equilibrium vector z(α). Here are two general
update strategies, which are both captured by the non-deterministic
step in line 7:
• Conservative Update. The opinion vector z is iteratively
updated in line 5 until all coordinates of z and s are suffi-
ciently far apart. Then, for every coordinate αi such that
αi = ui and zi < si , we flip αi to the lower bound li .
After we update α , we reset t to 0, and continue to iteratively
update z. Whenever we update α and set t to 0, we say that
a new phase begins; we use the convention that the initial
phase is known as phase 0.
• Opportunistic Update. Instead of waiting for the approxi-
mation error of every coordinate of z to be small enough, we
can update some coordinatesαi , ifαi = ui and zi ≤ si−err(t)
is small enough. However, there is some tradeoff between
waiting for the errors of all coordinates to be small enough
and updating coordinates of α that are ready sooner. In Sec-
tion 5, we will evaluate empirically different update strate-
gies.
Optimistic Update. In both conservative and opportunistic up-
dates, a coordinate αi is flipped only when we know for sure that
the current estimate zi has small enough error with respect to the
equilibrium zi (α); hence, no mistake in flipping any αi is ever made.
Algorithm 1: Local Search Framework
Input: Innate opinions s ∈ [0, 1]V ; interaction matrix P ; for each
agent i ∈ V , upper ui and lower li bounds for resistance.
Output: Optimal resistance vector α ∈ ×i∈V {li , ui }.
1 (Technical step.) Randomly perturb each coordinate of s slightly.
2 Initially, for each agent i , set αi ← ui to its upper bound; denote
ϵα := mini∈V αi .
3 Pick arbitrary z ∈ [0, 1]V , and set t ← 0; denote err(t ) := (1−ϵα )tϵα .
4 while ∃i ∈ V : |si − zi | ≤ err(t ) ∨ (zi < si ∧ αi = ui ) do
5 z ← As + (I − A)Pz , where A = Diag(α )
6 t ← t + 1
7 (Non-deterministic step.) Pick arbitrary L ⊆ V (that can be empty)
such that for each i ∈ L, zi ≤ si − err(t ) and αi = ui .
8 if L , ∅ then
9 for each i ∈ L do
10 Set αi ← li to its lower bound (and update ϵα ).
11 t ← 0
12 return Resistance vector α .
However, our insight is that as the algorithm proceeds, the general
trend is for every zi to decrease.
The first intuition is that if we start with some z(0) such that
every coordinate of z(0) is at least its equilibrium coordinate of
z(α), then z(t ) should converge to z(α) from above. The second
observation is that every time we flip some αi , this will not increase
any coordinate of the equilibrium vector z(α), thereby preserving
the condition that the current estimate z(t ) ≥ z(α). Hence, without
worrying about the accuracy of the current estimate z, we will
simply flip coordinate αi to li when zi drops below si . However, it
is possible that we might need to flip αi back to ui , if zi increases in
the next iteration and becomes larger than si again. We shall see in
Section 5 that this scenario is extremely rare. Specifically, in line 8
of Algorithm 2, the set J is (almost) always empty.
5 EXPERIMENTS
Experimental setup. Our experiments run on a server with 2.1
GHz Intel Xeon Gold 6152 CPU and 64GB of main memory. The
server is limited to activate at most 24 threads by the administrator.
The real network topologies we use in our experiment are shown
in Table 1; we interpret each network as an undirected graph. The
number n of nodes in the dataset networks ranges from about 1
million to 65 million; in each network, the numberm of edges is
around 2n to 30n.
Input Generation. For each dataset, we utilize the network topol-
ogy and generate the input parameters as follows. The innate opin-
ion si of each agent i is independently generated uniformly at
random from [0, 1]. For each edge {i, j} in the network, we inde-
pendently pickwi j uniformly at random from [0, 1]; otherwise, we
setwi j = 0. For (i, j) ∈ V ×V , we normalize Pi j := wi j∑
k∈V wik
. From
Lemma 4.2, one can see that approximating the equilibrium opin-
ions is more difficult when the resistance is low. However, since
we still want to demonstrate that the resistance for each agent can
have varied lower and upper bounds, we set the lower bound li of
each agent i independently such that with probability 0.99, li equals
0.001, and with probability 0.01, it is picked uniformly at random
Algorithm 2: Optimistic Local Search
Input: Innate opinions s ∈ [0, 1]V ; interaction matrix P ; for each
agent i ∈ V , upper ui and lower li bounds for resistance.
Output: Optimal resistance vector α ∈ ×i∈V {li , ui }.
1 (Technical step.) Randomly perturb each coordinate of s slightly.
2 Initially, for each agent i , set αi ← ui to its upper bound; denote
ϵα := mini∈V αi .
3 Pick z = (1, 1, . . . , 1), and set t ← 0; denote err(t ) := (1−ϵα )tϵα .
4 while ∃i ∈ V : |si − zi | ≤ err(t ) do
5 z ← As + (I − A)Pz , where A = Diag(α )
6 t ← t + 1
7 (Optimistic Candidates.) Set L ← {i ∈ V : zi ≤ si ∧ αi = ui }.
8 (Rare Mistakes.) Set J ← {i ∈ V : zi > si ∧ αi = li }.
9 if L ∪ J , ∅ then
10 for each i ∈ L do
11 Set αi ← li to its lower bound (and update ϵα ).
12 for each i ∈ J do
13 Set αi ← ui to its upper bound (and update ϵα ).
14 t ← 0
15 return Resistance vector α .
from [0.001, 0.1]. Similarly, each upper bound ui is independently
selected such that with probability 0.99, it equals to 0.999, and with
probability 0.01, it is chosen uniformly at random from [0.9, 0.999].
5.1 Update Strategies Comparison
We compare the following three update strategies described in
Section 4: conservative, opportunistic and optimistic. For the three
smaller networks (com-Youtube, com-LiveJournal, LiveJournal), we
apply all three update strategies. For the largest network (com-
Friendster), we only report the performance of the optimistic update
strategy, as the other two update strategies are not efficient enough
for such a large dataset.
Experimental Setup. For fair comparison among the update strate-
gies, we always initialize z = (1, 1, ..., 1). To compare their per-
formances, we plot a curve for each strategy. The curves have a
common x-axis, which corresponds to the number of times that the
vector z has been updated so far, i.e., the number of times line 5
(in both Algorithms 1 and 2) has been executed. Since line 5 is the
most time-consuming part of the algorithms, it will be a suitable
common reference. We use the term iteration to refer to each time
z is updated. For each update strategy, we explain what is plotted
for the y-axis.
• Conservative Strategy. We run Algorithm 1 such that in
line 7, L is non-empty only if for all i ∈ V , |si − zi | > err(t),
in which case, we pick L to be the collection of all i’s such
that αi = ui and zi ≤ si − err(t).
For the y-axis, we plot the ratio of agents i for which cur-
rently αi = li , or we know definitely that αi should be
switched to li , i.e., currently αi = ui and zi ≤ si − err(t).
In Algorithm 1, the iterations (referring to each time z is
updated) are grouped into phases, where a non-empty L in
an iteration marks the end of a phase. Observe that at the
end of a phase, for all i ∈ L, αi is set to li and t is reset to 0.
Table 1: Datasets Information
Name Number n of Nodes Numberm of Edges Description Source
com-Youtube 1,134,890 2,987,624 Youtube online social network [18]
com-LiveJournal 3,997,962 34,681,189 LiveJournal online social network [18]
LiveJournal 10,690,276 112,307,385 LiveJournal user and group membership network [17]
com-Friendster 65,608,366 1,806,067,135 Friendster online social network [18]
Hence, in the next iteration, no coordinate αi is certain to
be switched. Hence, the curve has a step-like shape, where
each plateau occurs after the end of each phase.
Observer that initially ϵα = mini ui ≥ 0.9. Hence, it takes
very few number of iterations to satisfy ∀i ∈ V : |si − zi | >
err(t); we call this the phase 0. At the end of the phase 0,
we set some αi = li and ϵα decreases significantly. Hence,
subsequent phases have many more iterations.
Observe that we can stop the iterative process, when for all
i ∈ V , |si −zi | > err(t), but there is no i ∈ V such that zi < si
and αi = ui . This marks the end of the curve.
In each phase, we pick L of line 7 as the collection of all i’s
such that zi ≤ si −err(t) only when ∀i ∈ V : |si −zi | > err(t)
(otherwise, we pick L = ∅). Then, we set αi = li for each
i ∈ L and t = 0. We call such a phase a conservative phase.
• Opportunistic Strategy.We run Algorithm 1 similarly as
before. Phase 0 is the same as the conservative strategy; we
call a phase conservative, if it follows the conservative update
strategy.
Starting from phase 1, we can perform it in an opportunistic
manner as follows. Recall that at the beginning of a phase, t
has just been reset to 0. At the t-th iteration of that phase,
we use L(t) to denote the collection of i’s such that zi ≤
si −err(t). For every 1000 iterations, we compute an estimate
slope(k) := |L(1000k ) |− |L(1000(k−1)) |1000 of the slope; we keep
track km of the maximum slope computed so far. After some
iteration, if the estimated slope drops below some factor
(we use 0.1 in our experiments) of km , then we end this
phase. Intuitively, each additional iteration flips only a small
number of coordinates αi , and hence, one would like to end
this phase. We call such a phase opportunistic.
Since typically the total number of phases is around 8, we
run phase 1 to 6 opportunistically, after which we run the
remaining phases conservatively to make sure that all coor-
dinates αi that need to be changed will be flipped.
As in the conservative update strategy, for the y-axis, we
plot the ratio of coordinates αi that currently αi = li , or
we know for sure should be switched to li , i.e. αi = ui and
zi ≤ si − err(t).
• Optimistic Strategy.We implement Algorithm 2, where in
each iteration after z is updated, a coordinate αi is (re)set
to li if zi < si , and (re)set to ui if zi > si . For the y-axis,
we plot the ratio of coordinates that currently take their
lower bounds. The curve ends when enough iterations are
performed after some coordinate of α is last updated, in
order to ensure that the estimate z is close enough to the
equilibrium vector according to Lemma 4.2.
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Figure 2: Update Strategies Comparison on com-Youtube.
Experiment Results. Each of Figures 2, 3 and 4 shows the plots
for the three strategies in the corresponding network (com-Youtube,
com-LiveJournal or LiveJournal). Figure 5 shows the plot of the
optimistic strategy in the com-Friendster network, where the other
two strategies are not efficient enough for such a large network.
As expected, the opportunistic strategy is slightly better than the
conservative strategy. From the positions of the plateaus, we can
see that the initial opportunistic phases end sooner than their con-
servative counterparts. Hence, overall the opportunistic strategy
performs slightly better than the conservative strategy; in increas-
ing sizes of the three tested networks, the numbers of iterations
taken by the opportunistic strategy are 79.2%, 77.9% and 71.5%,
respectively, of those taken by the conservative strategy.
On the other hand, the optimistic strategy can achieve the opti-
mal resistance vector with much fewer number of iterations than
the other two strategies. In increasing sizes of the three smaller
networks, the numbers of iterations taken by the optimistic strategy
are only 12.8%, 13.4% and 12.4%, respectively, of those taken by the
conservative strategy. Moreover, the optimistic strategy makes very
few mistakes; in increasing sizes of the four networks, the numbers
of times coordinates are flipped from lower bounds back to upper
bounds are 1, 0, 13 and 168, which are negligible for networks with
millions of nodes.
5.2 Running Time with Multiple Threads
We compare the actual running time using different number of
threads for the optimistic strategy on only the three smaller net-
works, since the largest network takes too long using only one
thread. Using all 24 available threads, running the optimistic strat-
egy on the com-Friendster network already takes around 50 hours.
The three bar graphs in Figure 6 show the running time (mea-
sured in minutes) for running the optimistic strategy with different
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Figure 3: Update Strategies Comparison on com-
LiveJournal.
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Figure 5: Optimistic Strategy on com-Friendster.
number of threads on the com-Youtube, com-LiveJournal and Live-
Journal networks. Since updating z (line 5 of Algorithm 2) is the
most time-consuming part of the algorithm, the fact that it is read-
ily parallelizable supports the empirical results that using multiple
threads can greatly reduce the running time, where the effect is
more prominent for larger networks.
6 TECHNICAL PROOFS
Lemma 6.1. (Lemma 3.1 restated) Given K ( V and α ∈ (0, 1)V ,
letA := Diag(α) and recall that P is the irreducible interaction matrix.
Then, the inverse M = [I − (I − A−K )P]−1 exists, and every entry
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Figure 6: Running Time with Different Number of Threads
on com-Youtube, com-LiveJournal and LiveJournal
of M is positive. Moreover, for each k ∈ V , define ak = 0 if k ∈ K ,
otherwise ak = αk . Then, we have:
(1) (PM)kk = Mkk−11−ak > 0;
(2) (PM)k j = Mk j1−ak > 0, for each j , k .
Proof. Observe that P corresponds to an irreducible random
walk. Hence, (I −A−K )P represents a diluted random walk, where
at the beginning of each step, the measure at nodes i < K will
suffer a factor of 1 − αi ∈ (0, 1). The irreducibility of the random
walk P means that every state is reachable from any state. Hence,
starting from any measure vector, eventually the measure at every
node will tend to 0. This means that (I − A−K )P has eigenvalues
with magnitude strictly less than 1. Therefore, we can consider the
following Neumann series of a matrix:
M = [I − (I −A−K )P]−1 = I +
∞∑
k=1
[(I −A−K )P]k ,
which implies that the inverse M exists, and every entry of M is
positive; in particular, for every k ∈ V ,Mkk > 1.
By the definition of M , we have [I − (I −A−K )P]M = I . We fix
some k ∈ V . By considering the (k,k)-the entry, i.e., the dot product
between the k-th row of [I − (I −A−K )P] and the k-th column of
M , we have
Mkk −
∑
i ∈V
(1 − ak )PkiMik = 1
where ak = 0 if k ∈ K , otherwise ak = αk < 1. Hence, we have
(PM)kk =
∑
i ∈V PkiMik = Mkk−11−ak .
Similarly, for j , k , by considering the dot product between the
k-th row of [I − (I −A−K )P] and the j-th column ofM , we have
Mk j −
∑
i ∈V
(1 − ak )PkiMi j = 0.
Hence, we have for j , k ,
(PM)k j =
∑
i ∈V
PkiMi j =
Mk j
1 − ak
,
as required. 
Lemma 6.2. (Lemma 3.3 restated) Referring to Lemma 3.2. For any
α ∈ (0, 1)V and any i ∈ V , denote M = [I − (I − A−{i })P]−1. Then,
∂f (α )
∂αi
has the same sign in {−, 0,+} as si −∑j,i Mi jα jsj , which is
independent of αi .
Proof. Using the Sherman-Morrison formula, we consider
X :=[I − (I −A)P]−1 = [I − (I −A−{i } − αieieTi )P]−1
=[I − (I −A−{i })P + αieieTi P]−1
=M − αi
1 + αieTi PMei
MeieTi PM .
Observe that eTi PMei = (PM)ii and (MeieTi PM)i j = Mii (PM)i j
for each j ∈ V . Then, by Lemma 3.1 with K = {i}, we have
Xii =Mii − αiMii (PM)ii1 + αi (PM)ii = Mii −
αiMii (Mii − 1)
1 + αi (Mii − 1)
=
(1 − αi + αiMii − αiMii + αi )Mii
1 − αi + αiMii =
Mii
1 − αi + αiMii ;
and for j , i ,
Xi j =Mi j −
αiMii (PM)i j
1 + αi (PM)ii = Mi j −
αiMiiMi j
1 + αi (Mii − 1)
=
(1 − αi + αiMii − αiMii )Mi j
1 − αi + αiMii =
(1 − αi )Mi j
1 − αi + αiMii .
By Lemma 3.2, we know ∂f (α )∂αi and si − zi (α) have the same sign
in {−, 0,+}. Recall that z(α) = [I − (I −A)P]−1As = XAs . Applying
the above results, we have
si − zi (α) =si −
∑
j ∈V
Xi jα jsj
=si − Miiαisi1 − αi + αiMii −
∑
j,i
(1 − αi )Mi jα jsj
1 − αi + αiMii
=
si (1 − αi + αiMii ) −Miiαisi − (1 − αi )∑j,i Mi jα jsj
1 − αi + αiMii
=
(1 − αi )(si −∑j,i Mi jα jsj )
1 − αi + αiMii .
Since αi ∈ (0, 1), we conclude that 1−αi1−αi+αiMii > 0. Thus
∂f (α )
∂αi
,
si − zi (α) and si −∑j,i Mi jα jsj have the same sign. 
Lemma 6.3. (Lemma 3.6 restated) For any i,k ∈ V such that i , k ,
let M = [I − (I −A−{i })P]−1 and R = [I − (I −A−{i,k })P]−1. Then
for any j ∈ V , we have
(1) Mjk =
Rjk
1+αkRkk−αk ,
(2) Mjh = Rjh − αkRjkRkh1+αkRkk−αk , for each h , k .
In particular, the quantity in Lemma 3.3 can be rewritten as follows:
si−
∑
j,i
Mi jα jsj = si−
∑
j,i,k
Ri jα jsj− αkRik1 + αkRkk − αk
(sk−
∑
j,i,k
Rk jα jsj ).
Proof. Using the Sherman-Morrison formula, we have
M = [I − (I −A−{i,k })P + αkekeTk P]−1
= R − αk
1 + αkeTk PRek
Reke
T
k PR
We can compute that eTk PRek = (PR)kk and (RekeTk PR)jh = Rjk (PR)kh
for j,h ∈ V . Then we have
Mjh = Rjh −
αkRjk (PR)kh
1 + αk (PR)kk
.
By Lemma 3.1, we obtain
Mjh = Rjh −
αkRjkRkh
1 + αkRkk − αk
for j,h ∈ V and h , k ,
and
Mjk = Rjk −
αkRjk (Rkk − 1)
1 + αkRkk − αk
=
Rjk
1 + αkRkk − αk
for j ∈ V .
as required. 
Lemma 6.4. (Lemma 3.7 restated) Suppose α ∈ (0, 1)V , recall
that A−{i,k } := Diag(α−{i,k }), and P corresponds to an irreducible
interaction matrix. For any i,k ∈ V such that i , k , let R = [I − (I −
A−{i,k })P]−1, then Rii = maxj ∈V Rji . Moreover, Rii = Rki if and
only if Pkk + Pki = 1.
Proof. We have [I − (I − A−{i,k })P]R = I . By considering the
dot product between each row of [I − (I −A−{i,k })P] and column i
of R, we have
Rii −
∑
h∈V
PihRhi = 1,Rki −
∑
h∈V
PkhRhi = 0,
and Rji −
∑
h∈V
(1 − α j )PjhRhi = 0, for j , i,k .
After rearranging, we have
Rii = 1 +
∑
h∈V
PihRhi ,Rki =
∑
h∈V
PkhRhi ,
and Rji = (1 − α j )
∑
h∈V
PjhRhi , for j , i,k .
Now it suffices to show that for j , i,k , the above Rji cannot be
the maximum among them, and Rki ≤ Rii .
First, we show thatRji cannot be themaximum. Since
∑
h∈V Pjh =
1 and α j ∈ (0, 1), we have
Rji = (1 − α j )
∑
h∈V
PjhRhi ≤ (1 − α j )max
h∈V
Rhi < max
h∈V
Rhi .
Thus, Rji cannot be the maximum.
Next, we show that Rki ≤ Rii by contradiction. Suppose Rki >
Rii , then Rki is the unique maximum in the i-th column of R. Since∑
h∈V Pkh = 1 and Rki =
∑
h∈V PkhRhi , it must be the case that
Pkk = 1. This means P corresponds to a random walk with absorb-
ing state k , which contradicts that P is irreducible. Therefore, we
have Rki ≤ Rii , and hence Rii = maxh∈V Rhi .
Observe that we already know Rji < Rii for j , i,k , and Rki =∑
h∈V PkhRhi . Hence, Rki = Rii implies that Pkk + Pki = 1.
Conversely, Pkk +Pki = 1 implies that Rki = PkkRki+PkiRii . As
argued above, we must have Pkk , 1, which implies Rki = Rii . 
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have given a solid theoretical analysis of the unbudgeted variant
of the opinion susceptibility problem, and designed scalable local
search algorithms that can solve the problem optimally on graphs
with millions of nodes.
We believe that our techniques will lead to insights for the anal-
ysis of the budgeted variant of the problem. We leave the task
of providing theoretical guarantees for greedy algorithms on the
budgeted variant as future work.
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